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Abstract—Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have been 
proposed to automate transportation industry in order to 
increase its accuracy, efficiency, throughput, and specially safety. 
Security plays an Undeniable important role on implementing 
VANETs in real life. Authentication is one of the basic elements 
of VANETs security. Proposed authentications protocols suffer 
from high overhead and cost. This paper presents a computation 
division based authentication which divide signature approvals 
between neighbor vehicles consequently decrease vehicles 
computation load. Simulation shows presented protocol propose 
an almost constant latency and closely zero message loss ratio 
related to traffic load, and improved efficiency compared with 
GSIS protocol. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, the transportation industry has become one of 
the most important subjects of social affairs. Vehicular ad-hoc 
networks (VANETs) have been proposed to automate this 
industry and decrease its risk for human lives. These networks 
can be used to increase the efficiency of driver assistance 
advanced systems, safety and capacity of roads, and comfort 
level of driver and passengers. VANET applications can be 
divided in welfare and safety groups. Traffic management 
information, electronic payment systems, navigation 
improvement, and providing welfare information and 
entertainment for passengers can be considered as welfare 
ones, and Accident preventing and collaboration with relief 
and security vehicles are the safety group. 
In general, vehicular ad-hoc networks can be considered as 
mobile ad-hoc networks. In a VANET, each vehicle operates 
as a smart node and can connect to other vehicles and 
transportation equipment. VANETs may have infrastructure 
but there is usually no infrastructure in mobile ad-hoc 
networks. Also, VANETs have more dynamic topology and 
higher speed of nodes. Path limitation for vehicles, existence 
of tools to predict their motion, nonexistence of limitation for 
transmitted power and consumed energy by the network, and 
considerable nodes density variation related to area are the 
VANETs difference. 
One of the most important goal of VANETs is to increase 
the safety of transportation industry. To achieve this goal,
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic for an ID-based method. 
 
 
VANETs themselves must be accurate, secure, and safe in the 
first step. Any unintentional or intentional mistakes could be 
followed by irreversible results. 
Security protocols that are proposed to obtain security in 
VANETs must satisfy requirements including authentication, 
privacy protection and anonymity, ability to track malicious 
nodes and revoking their certificate, preventing denial of 
service, confidentiality, integrity, and efficiency. Obviously, 
there should be a tradeoff between these security requirements 
and the cost and complexity of protocol. Authentication is one 
of the fundamental elements of VANETs security that verify 
messages transmitting and receiving by network’s legitimate 
authorized nodes. Authentication also decrease illegal nodes 
attacks [1]. Privacy protection and anonymity prevent vehicles 
path tracking and privacy abuses. So, the proposed 
authentication model should provide appropriate level of 
anonymity [1]. Impossibility of linking data prevent tracking a 
vehicle by enemy through eavesdropping network messages 
[2].  
the possibility of identification and removal of malicious 
TABLE I 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF RELATED PROTOCOLS. 
vehicle. Impossibility of denial of service prevent transmitter    
or receiver form denying that transmitting or receiving [3], 
 
 
Protocols Advantages Disadvantages 
[4]. So, false alarms are prevented and it will be possible to    
prove that a false alarm caused an accident [5]. Confidentiality 
and integrity grantee that other members specially a malicious 
one can not change a message [6]. The efficiency considers 
the protocol costs and latency requirements [2]. 
As VANETs have no infrastructure and subsequently a cen- 
ter node for network communication management and routing, 
nodes should perform routing, communication management 
and network topology configuration themselves. This can helps 
an attacker node to attack and destroy the network. Despite   
of low possibility of public key infrastructure and building 
VANETs for a short time premeditated plane, they need a key 
distribution and authentication protocol to prevent an attacker 
GSIS [11] User authentication 
and anonymity, 
Tracking ability 
 
Khomejani [22]   User authentication 
and anonymity, No 
need for road side 
unit 
GAP [23] User authentication 
and anonymity, 
Tracking ability 
High loss rate, Ap- 
proval time increas- 
ment proportional to 
revoked certificates 
High loss rate, Track- 
ing disability, Trans- 
mitter can deny mes- 
sage transmitting 
High loss rate 
node entering. 
Security of vehicular ad-hoc networks is one of the major 
problems that prevent implementation of VANETs in recent 
years. Many solutions such as information encryption, net- 
work isolation, using authentication for new entering vehicles, 
applying hardware with more than 99.99 percent reliability are 
proposed to improve VANETs security. But, still there are 
many problems should be solved to make VANETs 
implementable. 
One of the most important elements of VANETs security is 
authentication of transmitted messages by vehicles to prevent 
unauthorized nodes entering and external attacks. Popular 
authentication protocols can be divided in two groups. Some 
protocols use public key infrastructure for authentication [7]– 
[9], and the others include Id-based encryption [10]–[12]. At 
the first group each vehicle receives a pair of public and 
private key and a valid certificate from a reliable center. Main 
drawback of this protocols is high calculation overhead due to 
public key that cause messages latency. In the second group of 
authentication that use id-based encryption, each vehicle has 
an exclusive Id.  Key management center build a private key 
corresponding vehicle’s Id and transmit it to vehicle over a 
secure channel. Lower calculation overhead and easier 
signature approval are two main advantages of this protocols 
towards public key protocols. On the other hand, single point 
of failure (key management center) and possibility of Id 
forgery are disadvantages of the second group [13]–[16]. All 
above protocols are proposed without considering privacy and 
certificate revocation requirements. To satisfying certificate 
revocation requirement "certificate revoking list" is used that 
include all violator vehicles. This list is saved in all vehicles 
and used to prevent receiving a message from a violator 
vehicle. Two major problem of this solution is cost of keeping 
the list up-dated and saving it in all vehicles [17], 
[18]. 
Some protocols presented to solve the privacy protection 
and anonymity problems use "pseudonym" for user anonymity 
[19], [20]. Regarding this, each user receives several 
temporary certificates from a reliable center that are stored 
with user’s real profile in a reliable database. This protocols 
use almost more than 43 thousands temporary certificates over 
just one year to propose an acceptable level of efficiency and 
anonymity [17]. This amount of certificates is followed by 
problems such as memory overhead, long searching time, long 
certificate revoking time, up-dating cost, and high 
communication overhead. 
Group signature could be used for users' anonymity in order 
to remove temporary certificate weaknesses [9], [21]. In this 
protocol, group manager authenticates each user with its real 
identity at the first step. Also, the manager produces a private 
key for user and gives it to user with group public key After 
Authentication and saves the user private key and real identity 
in its database. In this protocol, each group manager has a 
master key which can be used with user signature to obtain 
user private key, then it can search its database to find message 
transmitter real identity. Hybrid protocols combine this two 
protocols to use their advantages together [11]. Advantages 
and drawbacks of three related protocols are summarized in 
Table I. 
II. PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
In the proposed protocol, it is assumed that there is a reliable 
center for key distribution and management. Also, it assumes 
that roadside units (RSUs) have a high computing abilities and 
can build a proper communication coverage to up-date and 
revoke the certificates. It is assumed roadside units use   an 
electronic elliptical curve signature algorithm as public key 
infrastructure for certification. This algorithm is usually used 
in other VANETs authentication protocols. In proposed 
protocol, each RSU is considered as a local reliable center    
on its zone. So, vehicles can receive local valid certificate for 
each zone from its RSU. Country transportation centers can 
act as backbone of this protocol. 
The protocol assumed each vehicle can at-least connect to 
one roadside unit to up-date its temporary certificate. Also, 
RSUs are physically protected and secure, connected to other 
units and reliable center over a secure Internet, satellite, radio 
waves or cable base channel. Each vehicles is loaded with    
an accurate navigation system. Moreover, it’s assumed that 
attacker can access and change all messages, so confidentiality 
S 
S 
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TABLE II 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Abbreviations Explanation 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝐾 (M ) Message M asymmetric encryption algorithm 
by key K 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝐾 (M ) Message M asymmetric decryption algorithm 
by key K 
signK−1 (M ) Simple electronically signing algorithm for 
message M using private key K−1 
Certi Vehicle i certificate signed by reliable center 
P Key−1 
P Key+1 
Roadside unit/ Vehicle (S) private key for 
electronically signing 
Roadside unit/ Vehicle S public key for elec- 
tronically signing 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Certificate receiving algorithm. 
RL Revoked certificates list (Revoking List) 
K−1 
+1 
Vehicle S private key for temporary certificate  
in its database for future follow-up. Vehicle can use these 
KS Vehicle S private key for temporary certificate 
 
 
 
is required for all messages (every persons must not access 
messages text). In the proposed protocol electronic signature is 
used for confidentiality. As a result, each receiver can identify 
transmitter of its received messages and transmitter can not 
deny that transmitting. 
The proposed protocol is divided in two parts that use proper 
mechanisms due to theirs requirements and circumstances. Id- 
based electronic signature mechanisms is used in vehicle to 
infrastructure connection to satisfy vehicle tracking capability 
by reliable center and denial of service impossibility. A 
mechanism is required for legitimate vehicles identification 
and messages verification in vehicle to vehicle (V2V) connec- 
tion due to vehicles limited sources and network economical 
requirements. So, a simple electronic signature protocol based 
on pseudonym is used for privacy protection in proposed 
protocol. 
Major problems of previous protocols proposed for authenti- 
cation and privacy protection in VANETs are high calculation 
certificate and keys to communicate with roadside units for    
a long time (e.g. a year). 
Reliable center build a public and private key for each 
roadside unit depend on its zone. The roadside unit uses the 
private key for a period to communicate with vehicles. These 
keys are periodically updated after each technical checkpoint 
to prevent attacker manipulation. 
 
B. Temporary Certificate Recieving 
Every vehicle, in each zone, receives a temporary certificate 
from roadside unit to communicate with other vehicles that are 
in that zone. In this regard, vehicle should firstly authenticates 
itself to roadside unit. The roadside unit issues a temporary 
certificate after it makes sure the vehicle is legal and is not    
in the revoked list. When the vehicle certificate expired or it 
enter another roadside unit territory, it re-does this procedure 
to receive a new certificate. 
As Fig. 2 shows vehicle S (OBU), in order to receive or up-
date its temporary certificate, firstly build a pair of public and 
private keys (K−1,K+1) using electronic signature 
S S 
and processing load that are forced to vehicles processors, 
consequently decreasing system efficiency and throughput 
severely. Solution of these problems is assignment of heavy 
calculation to network infrastructure as its possible or splitting 
calculations over the network. In this regard, a cooperative 
protocol is proposed to verifies each message signature that 
splits calculations between vehicles. Also, revoked certificates 
checking mechanism is done by roadside units. The proposed 
protocol include five subsequent steps. 
A. Network Set-up 
In the first step, each vehicle goes to a reliable center in 
person. The center issues a pair of public and private keys  
and a certificate for that vehicle after equipment technical 
checking. Also, it stores the keys and signed certificate on the 
vehicle and saves the signed certificate and vehicle identity 
key building algorithm and signs the built public key using 
its private key. Then it uses  a  hash  function  and connects 
the roadside unit zone to achieves roadside unit public key  
and sends encrypted message to the relevant roadside unit 
(R). Roadside unit uses its private key to decrypt certificate 
request message received from vehicle S. Then it uses vehicle 
certificate to confirm it is not in the revoking list. Finally, 
roadside unit issues a temporary certificate by  its  private  
key. The certificate includes vehicle public key, certificate 
validity period, and an Id produced randomly by roadside unit. 
Roadside unit saves the built certificate with vehicle certificate 
on its database. Then it wait for at-most δ second to prevent 
detection of any relation between new and old certificates 
before it sent the certificate to vehicle S. Henceforth, vehicle S 
can communicate anonymously with other vehicles using this 
certificate. 
S 
× 
C. Message Signing and Sending 
Each vehicle uses its private key (K−1) to sign its messages. 
Then, it send the signed message with its temporary certificate 
and Id over the network. 
 
D. Signature Approval and Message Receiving 
In previous proposed protocols for vehicle ad-hoc network, 
the vehicle checks each received message signature. Consid- 
ering each vehicle sent a message in every 100-300 ms, and 
there were almost 100 vehicles at each vehicle communication 
coverage, each vehicle should check 1000 messages signature 
in just one second. So, the time for confirmation of each 
message should be less than 1 ms that is a very short time    
for electronic signature approval which cause receiver buffer 
overflow, and increase of messages loss rate. In this protocols, 
each message is checked by all vehicles receive it that strongly 
decrease the efficiency and throughput and cause vehicles 
processors be busy to do duplicated processes. 
In the proposed protocol, each vehicle checks some of 
messages and informs other, in case of  message  signature 
was not verified. This solution reduces vehicles processing and 
computational load. So, strong processors are not required for 
vehicles result in system cost reduction. Also, high message 
loss rate due to electronic signature algorithms processing is 
reduced cause efficiency increasing. 
The most important part of above solution is vehicles 
cooperation in order to achieve an acceptable rate of efficiency 
and throughput. In this protocol, each vehicle keeps a list of 
its neighbors Ids and up-date it with each message reception 
from the list member. Then it singes its neighbors list with its 
private key and send signed list with its temporary certificate 
over the network every θ seconds. Other vehicles use this list 
to identify their mutual neighbors with the sender, and check 
that are they the verifier of its messages or not? if vehicle      
A be the vehicle B verifier, since then it will verify vehicle    
B messages else it will wait for another vehicle to verify B. 
Consider β as vehicle A & B Id difference, α1 as the highest 
and αk as the shortest difference between vehicle B Id and its 
mutual neighbors with A, and αp as the pth highest difference. 
In the proposed protocol, vehicle A verify B when, β be less 
or equal αp. 
Vehicle A receives message M from vehicle B and uses its 
Id that is in the M to check its neighbors list. If vehicle B      
Id wasn’t in the list or vehicle A be the B verifier, checks 
vehicle V certificate by its public key. If the signature was 
verified, vehicle A update its list and delivers the message to 
application layer. On the other side, if the signature wasn’t 
verified by vehicle B public key, vehicle A send a message 
over the network to informs others. In case vehicle A was    
not verifier of B, it waits for ∆t ms. If it receives a message   
in relation to message M disapproval, it will forward it to      
its neighbors and recheck message M signature for more 
assurance. If it didn’t receive a message after ∆t ms telling 
message M disapproval, it considers M as a verified message 
and delivers it to application layer. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Signature approval flowchart. 
 
 
E. Tracking and Certificate Revoking 
Reliable center can extract the main certificate of vehicle off 
the roadside unit database using vehicle temporary certificate 
that is in its message. Then, the center can find malicious      
or attacker vehicle identity in its  database.  Finally,  it  add 
the target vehicle certificate to revoked certificates list and 
update it on all roadside units to prevent malicious vehicle 
from continuing its operation. 
III. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
As it was said before, in previous protocols for VANETs 
each vehicle checks all received messages signature. It means 
each message is checked for n (number of vehicles received 
the message) times. While, in proposed protocol each message 
is checked at least p (not all vehicles received the message) 
times and at most 5 p times. The more p is decreased, less 
duplicated precesses are done by system and efficiency is 
increased. But, whatever p becomes lower, the probability of 
malicious abuses grows. So, there must be a trade off between 
efficiency and security. 
The best case of choosing verifiers is that there be verifiers 
in both directions of vehicle. If p(B) be considered as the 
probability of choosing one vehicle in front and one vehicle  
in the back of vehicle to verify and N be the number of 
vehicles that should verify message M, for N=15 p(B) is equal 
to 0.99998 as shown in Fig. 4 that can be considered as 1 and 
is acceptable. So, the best value for p is 5 that each message  
is on average checked by 15 vehicles. 
Another challenge in proposed protocol is determination of 
∆t. whatever this time gets longer, network end-to-end delay 
increases. On the other hand if this time wasn’t enough, it’s 
possible that an invalid message considered as valid. So, ∆t 
must bo longer than sum of times of one message confirmation 
and transmission delay. In the worth case, it is equal to 
message end-to-end delay when, the vehicle is checked all 
messages itself. Based on done simulations, this time average 
is  equal  to  15  ms  when  there  are  25  vehicles  around  the 
 × 
 
Fig. 4. Probability of choosing verifier vehicles in both sides of a vehicle. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Schematic of simulation zone. 
 
 
vehicle. As a precaution ∆t  is  considered  30  ms  to assure 
all messages will be checked. 
Temporary certificate (key) can have several consequences 
on the proposed protocol. Shorter lifetime means better privacy 
protection and more on-time revoking. But, fast certificate up- 
dating is followed by higher connection and commuting costs. 
Also, some application programs of VANETs require messages 
relationship detection in a specified time, So the certificate 
lifetime must not be less than this time. Beside these, it  
should be noted that certificate lifetime is combination of time- 
based expiration and zone-based expiration, as a result lifetime 
selection should be proper to zone dimensions. Considering all 
above factors, 10 to 20 minutes is recommended for temporary 
certificate lifetime. 
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULT 
A 3 3 km2 urban area is considered as simulation zone, 
shown in Fig. 5. In simulation, Vehicles coverage is 300 meter 
that every 300 ms a message containing velocity, direction, 
acceleration, and location of vehicle is broadcasting. 
 
Fig. 6. Variation off latency respect to traffic load obtained from simulation. 
 
 
waiting for message confirmation by neighbors. This delay is 
predictable and is equal to summation of signing, message 
broadcasting, and waiting (∆t) times. It should be noted that  
in fact the simulated delay time (almost 35 ms) is very shorter 
than the acceptable delay value (100 ms) defined in IEEE1609 
standard. So, from the standpoint of delay, the proposed 
protocol will mack no problem for application programs. 
Traffic load effect on messages-loss average rate for the 
proposed protocol, and the GSIS and Khomejani ones are 
shown in Fig. 7. It is seen that in GSIS and Khomejani 
protocols message loss rate increases with traffic load, but the 
loss rate for proposed protocol is almost zero. This is the result 
of vehicles cooperation for messages signature checking. 
Number of checked signature in proportion with received 
messages in the proposed protocol can be seen in Fig. 8. The 
more this value approaches to 1, it means vehicles cooperation 
decreases and more duplicated works is done in the network. 
In the proposed protocol, whatever traffic load gets higher, 
cooperation increase and each vehicle checks less messages. 
Also, number of messages checked by one vehicle in 30   
ms period is illustrated in Fig. 9. Vehicle received messages 
increase with traffic load. In the GSIS protocol, the processor 
can only check 43 messages in every 300 ms, so in every 
period (300 ms) at most 43 messages is delivered to upper 
layer. But, vehicles cooperation in proposed protocol causes 
the processor checks fewer messages and loaded with less pro- 
cessing load. So, the proposed protocol has a better efficiency 
than the GSIS protocol. 
 
TABLE III 
SIMULATION SETTING 
Vehicle  density  is  one  the  major  factors  have  effect  on    
system efficiency. Whatever vehicle density gets higher in a 
vehicle coverage, more vehicles receives transmitted message 
and also, the vehicle receives more messages. So, messages 
wait on the queue longer and end-to-end delay increases. Fig. 6 
shows the effect of traffic load on end-to-end average delay 
for proposed protocol, and GSIS and Khomejani protocols. 
As Fig. 6 shows, end-to-end delay for proposed protocol    
is almost fix despite the GSIS and Khomejani protocols that 
their delay increase with traffic load. The proposed protocol 
Abbreviations Explanation 
 
 
Topology dimensions 3000×3000 m 
Simulation time  100 s 
Vehicle coverage 300 m 
Network bandwidth   6 Mb/s 
Access  layer channel protocol IEEE 802.11 P 
Vehicles antenna  Omni-antenna 
Vehicles speed 30-75 Km/h 
delay is longer than other two protocols caused by vehicle    
  
Fig. 7. Estimated traffic message loss ratio versus different traffic loads. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Message approval ratio obtained from simulation against traffic load. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a new protocol is proposed for user 
authentication and privacy protection. In this protocol, 
vehicles co- operation is used for messages signature checking 
to decrease messages loss rate. The simulations results show 
significant improvement on message loss rate parameter with 
comparison to the GSIS and the Khomejani protocols. On the 
other hand, end-to-end delay of proposed protocol is longer 
than the other ones, but it’s still much less than the maximum 
acceptable value defined by standards and could be 
overlooked. 
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